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A DIFFERENT DRUMMERT
HONORABLE W. BREVARD HAND*
INTRODUCTION
At the core of our existence lies our dignity as humans:
our thoughts as individuals and the liberty to express our
thoughts and pursue our desires as we see fit. At the core of
our Constitution lies the governance of our nation: entrusted
to the people, the individuals who make up the governed, the
diverse array of thoughts, ideals, beliefs, and convictions that
buoy our freedom and enhance our liberty to pursue our own
lifestyle, our own definition of freedom. As we march along
bound by individual liberty, the fact remains that our differ-
ent personalities often hear entirely different drummers
keeping time and marking out the beat in our parade of life.
The security provided by our Constitution lies in its guaran-
tee to each individual, that no matter how abstruse the beat
or how strange the syncopation, the ability to choose and fol-
low any drummer one may hear remains with the individual,
and that such a choice will never be made by the govern-
ment. Over the recent decades the expression of liberty in-
herent to our freedom has bent back upon itself, threatening
to form each of us into a single, faceless band, devoid of indi-
vidual expression, marching to the beat of a solitary
drummer.
The problem does not arise because people march to the
same drummer, but because they do not choose, as individu-
als, to march to the beat they are forced to follow. It is not
uncommon for us to misunderstand the drummer others may
hear. Nor is it uncommon for us to try and influence others
to follow our drummer. In fact, this constant give and take,
this ongoing comparison of drumbeats, patterns and styles,
molds our own thoughts, causes us to question our beliefs,
and strengthens our convictions as we focus our minds and
grow to maturity. This wrestling of ideas between individuals
of differing backgrounds, both environmental and educa-
tional, affects our march cadence as we course our allotted
t This text was adapted from an address given to the Notre Dame
Community, January 27, 1988, as part of the Thomas J. White Center on
Law & Government Lecture Series.
* United States District Judge, Southern District of Alabama.
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
time. Recognizing that our fellow man may hear an entirely
different drummer, we must not criticize the step as out of
sequence, but rather we must appreciate the sound of the dif-
ferent tune and realize the intellectual vitality stimulated by a
discourse of ideas.
Particularly in the educational arena, where the forma-
tion of young minds requires a full experience to stimulate
the search for eternal truths, the tendency to criticize the dif-
ferent tunes must be set aside for a complete educational ex-
perience to emerge. By contrasting our own ideas with the
provocative beats of other drummers, we strengthen our
minds; we add vitality to our intellectual endeavors by rising
to the challenge posed by opposing viewpoints. In our mod-
ern pluralistic society, the wealth of individual ideas guides
our liberty and freedom by stimulating intellectual strength.
Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, particularly
in the area of the religion clauses, threaten our intellectual
strength by stifling our educational achievement. By drown-
ing out the sounds of the different drummers, the federal ju-
diciary has taken the decision away from the individual and
instead decides for the individual which drummer he might
follow.
I. THE PRESENT STATE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED
STATES
Recent testimony from a number of highly regarded
educational experts, who testified before me in Smith v. Board
of School Commissioners' outlined the direction of modern edu-
cation. Their conclusion is that its effect today is directed to-
ward social man vis-&-vis the individual. Society today is bet-
ter served, so says this philosophy, when the process turns out
consensus minds, for they are more easily steered in the
"right" direction; in other words, round pegs for round
holes. Put another way, we will all march to the same drum
beat. This is what has been described as the "dumbing
down" process you may have heard discussed lately and to
what Dr. Bloom alluded when he wrote that the modern stu-
dent is encouraged to maintain such an open mind for all
things that he ends up with no mind at all.' All of this, so the
testimony revealed, began as a result of the influence of John
Dewey and his progeny, starting soon after the turn of the
century.
1. 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987).
2. See A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987).
[Vol. 3
A DIFFERENT DRUMMER
Rather than stimulating minds to intellectual heights by
prodding students to question their beliefs, and thereby firm-
ing their convictions, modern education too often produces
students who complacently accept what is fed to them during
their formative years. Rather than stimulating minds to indi-
vidual thought and encouraging students to question author-
ity in order to determine its boundaries, modern education
promotes blind acceptance of authority and instills apathy in
our youth when it comes to the future. Our students do not
choose to follow such a domineering drummer who won't al-
low them to question the beat, but our educational system
has evolved to produce young minds that fail to discern the
need to question the direction authority takes. I firmly be-
lieve that the basic test of the efficacy of education is whether
the student becomes as a thermostat rather than as a ther-
mometer; whether one works to control his environment or
whether one merely reflects his environment as it changes.
Especially in matters concerning the type of political system
under which we will continue to live and function, students of
today must grow to control the environment and shape the
boundaries of authority within which the government must
operate.
II. THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER INCORPORATION
Presently a storm is swirling around the debate over the
doctrine of incorporation and the Supreme Court's position
relative thereto. This debate occurs mainly in the halls of
academe and the courts, with some spillover into the legal
profession and, to a modest degree, the body politic. Those
engaged in it are sometimes referred to as intentionalists and
nonintentionalists or interpretivists and noninterpretivists.
An example of the heat that this discourse has generated was
quite apparent in the recent confirmation hearings in regard
to the nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme
Court. Indeed, it is a debate in which we are vitally interested
and in which we must, at some point, take part. For the reso-
lution of this debate will greatly impact on the future of this
nation. Because this is so, we simply cannot afford to be a
thermometer.
A. The Noninterpretivist's View of the Constitution
There are those in contemporary society that believe
that our Constitution simply embodies the aspiration to social
1988]
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justice, brotherhood, and human dignity that brought this
nation into being; that the instruments of birth solemnly
committed the United States to be a country where the dig-
nity and rights of all persons are equal before all authority.
The instrument of the Constitution itself, "[l]ike every text
worth reading, it is not crystalline. . . . Its majestic generali-
ties and ennobling pronouncements are both luminous and
obscure" s and, as a result, "calls forth interpretation."4 "The
Constitution is fundamentally a public text"" involving the
most fundamental issues confronting our democracy, and the
main burden of drawing meaning from the text, in order to
resolve public controversies, resides in the Supreme Court.
The desired principle to be applied by the Supreme Court,
the final arbiter of the Constitution in interpreting that text,
is "account for the existence of these substantive value
choices, and . . . accept the ambiguity inherent in the effort
to apply them to modern circumstances."' The "acceptance
of [these] fundamental principles has not and should not bind
[the Court] to those precise, at times anachronistic
contours."'
This theory espouses that each generation has the choice
to overrule or add to the fundamental principles expressed
by the Framers and to translate the majestic generalities of
the Bill of Rights into concrete restraints on official dealings
as they appear in the twentieth century. It is stated that
the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static mean-
ing it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but
in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with cur-
rent problems and current needs. What the constitutional
fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot
be their measure to the vision of our time. Similarly, what
those fundamentals mean for us, our descendants will learn,
cannot be their measure to the vision of their time.8
Summing up, this proposition translates to the fact that
the Constitution is a sublime oration on the dignity of man.
This philosophy concludes that though the Constitution may
be amended, such requires immense effort on the part of the
3. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratifica-
tion, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 2, 2 (1985).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id. at 6.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 7.
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people as a whole; and if the overarching theory of the worth
and dignity of the human is kept in view, then the Constitu-
tion itself may expand and grow to fit these needs of any
given time by considering the principle that it is the foremost
duty of the Court to do this in the preservation of individual
rights.
B. The Interpretivist's View of the Constitution
Opposed to the position just expressed, there are those
who adhere to the proposition, as stated by Professor Raoul
Berger, that "[t]he Constitution represents fundamental
choices that have been made by the people, and the task of
the Courts is to effectuate them, 'not [to] construct new
rights.' When the judiciary substitutes its own value choices
for those of the people it subverts the Constitution by usurpa-
tion of power." 9 In effect, "[s]ubstitution by the Court of its
own value choices for those embodied in the Constitution vi-
olates the basic principle of government by consent of the
governed."' Thus, "the Supreme Court has no authority to
substitute an 'unwritten Constitution' for the written Consti-
tution the Founders gave us and the people ratified.""
This position also has been stated in this fashion: a safe
republican government depends upon a constitution that
should be venerated by the people as fundamental and para-
mount. To secure the stability sought, the Framers recog-
nized that the Constitution itself would have to be a written
document that would have textural permanence. Such a writ-
ing would assist in keeping this agreement a limited one be-
cause these founders had determined from experience that
you could not trust the good intentions of those who wielded
power. The entire point of a written constitution in clear,
common language is to serve as a stumbling block to keep
those in power from imposing their independent will on the
society as a whole. It was stated thusly:
The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow
citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a
rule of conduct upon others, is so energetically supported
by some of the best and some of the worst feelings incident
9. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 291-92 (1977) (footnote
omitted).
10. Id. at 296.
11. Id. at 297-98.
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to human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint
by anything but want of power.1 '
Speaking to the point of view expressed by noninterpre-
tivists, Judge Bork noted:
Leading authors who seemed to gravitate to this view ap-
parently are agreed that a valid area of constitutional adju-
dication-if one is possible; some deny even that-ought
not, and perhaps cannot, be rooted in the intentions of
those who wrote, proposed, and ratified the document and
its various amendments for to deny the written Constitution
as having the force of law is essential to giving the judges
the powers that are needed, for any limits contained therein
would have to be transgressed by them. As the argument
goes, it is noted, that since the Constitution is not Law, it
does not bind the judges, and judges are free to, and indeed
must, derive their rulings from sources, such as moral phi-
losophy, conventional morality, natural law, impulses to po-
litical reform, and so on. 8
Those who adhere to strict construction of the Constitu-
tion as written law do not agree with this theory. They admit
that while
there is, perhaps, something ennobling about [moral cer-
tainty and judicial power], it is ennobling but wrong.
[Their] logic assumes a truly philosophic disposition on the
part of the judge; not simply to know, strictly know, those
moral rights, but more important, to be able and willing to
distinguish those moral certainties from his own prejudices
and ideological inclinations. . . The tendency of all man-
kind is a tendency to confuse justice with one's perception of
justice. The defects of the human economy being what they
are, we should at least doubt anyone's ability to distill their
undefective reason from the swirling confusion of their
opinions, passions and interests. To assert . . . that judges
above all other mortals are capable of such virtue, is a case
of the wish being the father to the thought. 4
Judge Learned Hand put the proposition this way:
Legal philosophers have disputed for more than two thou-
sand years about what law means . . . It is the conduct
12. J. S. Mill, On Liberty in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD
273 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952).
13. Bork, Foreword to G. McDOWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND CON-
TEMPORARY THEORY at v (1985).
14. G. McDOWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITU-
TIONAL THEORY 7 (1985).
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which the government, whether it is a king, or a popular
assembly, will compel individuals to conform to, or to which
it will at least provide forcible means to secure conformity
*... The law is the command of government, and it must
be ascertainable in some form if it is to be in enforced at all
Men of common sense are always needed, and judges
are by no means always men of common sense. They are
quite like the rest of us. But it is also easy to go wrong, if
one gives them too much latitude. The other school would
give them almost complete latitude. They argue that a
judge should not regard the law, that this has never really
been done in the past, and that to attempt even to do it is
an illusion. He must conform his decisions to what honest
men would think right, and it is better for him to look into
his own heart to find out what that is. As I have already
said, in a small way some such process is inevitable when
one is interpreting any written words. When a judge tries to
find out what the government would have intended which it
did not say, he puts into its mouth things which he thinks it
ought to have said, and that is very close to substituting
what he himself thinks is right .
But the judge must always remember that he should go
no further than he is sure the government would have gone
. . . . If he is in doubt, he must stop, for he cannot tell that
the conflicting interests in society for which he speaks
would have come to a just result, even though he is sure
that he knows what the just result should be. He is not to
substitute even his juster will for theirs; otherwise it would
not be the common will which prevails, and to that extent
the people would not govern."
One could spend a great deal of time articulating the di-
vergent opinions and the justifications for them. It is not the
purpose of this paper to labor that oar. I will simply note that
for the first 150 years or so of this Republic, the interpre-
tivist's view carried the day. (It is interesting to note that the
change to a noninterpretivist approach has some remarkable
15. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 104 (1960).
16. Id. at 107-08.
17. Id. at 109.
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parallel with the changing philosophy of education instituted
by the acceptance of the John Dewey theories.) Where I ac-
knowledge that the noninterpretivist view is the apparent
prevailing view on our present Supreme Court, and in a num-
ber of the teaching institutions of the day, I would strongly
question whether it is appropriate to dismiss the view of in-
terpretivists, as does Justice Brennan when he noted:
[D]emands that Justices discern exactly what the Framers
thought about the question under consideration and simply
follow that intention . . . is a view that feigns self-effacing
deference to the specific judgments of those who forged
our original social compact. But in truth it is little more
than arrogance cloaked as humility. It is arrogant to pre-
tend that from our vantage we can gauge accurately the in-
tent of the Framers on application of principle to specific,
contemporary questions."
This is so because "[t]ypically, all that can be gleaned is that
the Framers themselves did not agree about the application
or meaning of particular constitutional provisions''19 and,
"[i]ndeed, it is far from clear whose intention is relevant...
or even whether the idea of an original intention is a coher-
ent way of thinking .... ,,20 If this is so, then the courts
have wasted time in the past in those instances where they
have sought to ascertain, through legislative history, the in-
tent of the legislature when passing on various acts that were
the subjects of litigation before them. Likewise, it would ap-
pear just as vain and self-effacing to look to determine what
the framers of the fourteenth amendment had in mind when
it was adopted.
C. The History of the Interpretivist's Viewpoint in
Constitutional Adjudication: The Religion Clauses
Thus stated, what I would have you focus upon, for our
purposes, is the net effect of the noninterpretivist theory as it
has impacted upon the first amendment and in particular the
religion clauses. Up until approximately forty years ago the
Supreme Court's attitude toward these religion clauses gener-
ally remained that which had existed from the beginning of
the Republic. This resulted from those determinations made
18. Brennan, supra note 3, at 4.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 4-5.
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by the Justices of the Court from what was perceived as being
their obligation when called upon to determine the meaning
of the Constitution. As Justice Story put it:
In construing the Constitution of the United States, we are
in the first instance to consider, what are its nature and ob-
jects, its scope and design, as apparent from the structure of
the instrument, viewed as a whole and also viewed in its
component parts. Where its words are plain, clear and de-
terminate, they require no interpretation . . . .Where the
words admit of two senses, each of which is conformable to
general usage, that sense is to be adopted, which without
departing from the literal import of the words, best harmo-
nizes with the nature and objects, the scope and design of
the instrument.21
In regard to the Bill of Rights, the adopters all agreed
that it would act as a curb on the national power, an attitude
accepted and acknowledged by the Supreme Court in the
case of Barron v. Baltimore.2" There, Chief Justice Marshall
stated that the Constitution said what it meant and meant
what it said, that neither political expediency nor political de-
sire were sufficient to change the clear import of the lan-
guage of the Constitution, and that the Bill of Rights did not
apply to the states.
I suppose that such a point of view came from our inher-
itance of the English common law system. Dr. Samuel John-
son defined interpret as: "To explain; to translate; to deci-
pher; to give solution; to clear by exposition; to expound."'
Note that conspicuously missing from this definition is the
power to alter the meaning. Lord Coke had found that acts
of Parliament were to be construed according to the intent
and meaning of the makers of them, thus the original intent
and meaning was to be observed. 4 Chancellor Hatten in
1677 wrote, "When the intent is proved, that must be fol-
lowed."2 In 1736 Matthew Bacon wrote that "[s]uch a con-
struction ought to be put upon a statute, as may best answer
the intention which the makers had in view . . . .A thing
21. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 405 (Cooley ed. 1873).
22. 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 243 (1833).
23. S. JOHNSON, JOHNSON's ENGLISH DICTIONARY 305 (1755).
24. Magdalen College Case, 11 Co. Rep. 66, 73, 77 Eng. Rep. 1235
(K.B. 1615).
25. C. HATTEN, A TREATISE CONCERNING STATUTES OR AcTs OF PARLIA-
MENT AND THE EXPOSITION THEREOF 14-15 (1677).
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which is within the letter of a statute, is not within such stat-
ute, unless it be not within the intention of the makers."2
The role of the judiciary as interpreter of the Constitu-
tion was buttressed also by the fact that at the time of the
framing of the Constitution the conventioneers determined
to exclude justices from a proposed council of revision that
would share the president's veto of legislation, correctly con-
sidering that the power of making ought to be kept distinct
from the power of expounding.
A final historical point is reflected by the comments of
Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison17 in which he
said:
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and
that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the
Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers lim-
ited, and to what purpose that limitation committed to writ-
ing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those in-
tended to be restrained."8
He went on to note that if constitutions are alterable at the
pleasure of the legislature or the courts, "then written consti-
tutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to
limit a power, in its own nature illimitable."29
Thus, it was clearly the law of the land that the first
amendment's proscription against the establishment of a reli-
gion and the requirement that the people be given the free
exercise of their religious beliefs was a proscription against
the federal government only. Not until Everson v. Board of
Education0 and Reynolds v. United States"1 did the United
States Supreme Court take upon its shoulders the duty of in-
corporating this proscription of the Bill of Rights to the
states. Now I do not imply that the Court had not from time
to time touched on the issue of religion in the United States,
but it wasn't until later in our history that the Court reversed
itself and decreed that the Constitution was thus amended so
as to incorporate; and what a quagmire they have jumped
into.
26. 7 M. BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 457-
58 (7th ed. London 1832).
27. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
28. Id. at 166.
29. Id.
30. 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
31. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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D. The Effect of the Noninterpretivist Viewpoint on
Constitutional Adjudication: The Religion Clauses
Instead of leaving it as it was, reposing in the good judg-
ment of the people to resolve the religious problems, if
any-a wisdom understood and appreciated by the Founders
which the passage of time and the lack of persecutions has
dimmed for us-our High Court, in its infinite wisdom, has
determined that, in light of our pluralistic society today, it
must take upon its shoulders the onerous burden of carving
out the appropriate niche in which theistic, atheistic, agnos-
tic, and all other belief systems should properly reside. From
my point of view the result is that we are trampling upon the
soul of man. It is an area that has produced great wars, many
revolutions, and no divined universal solution. It wasn't nec-
essary; it isn't necessary; and, it will not be resolved by such
efforts.
Consider briefly some of the results. In Stone v. Graham,"2
the majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the State
of Kentucky had no articulable secular purpose in posting the
Ten Commandments in the public school rooms, finding in-
stead that the purpose was "plainly religious in nature" and
this was so because "the Ten Commandments are undeniably
a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legis-
lative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to
that fact."" However, in Florey v. Sioux Falls School District,"
the court of appeals permitted the public school observance
of the religious elements of Christmas stating that it pro-
moted the articulated secular purpose of " 'advanc[ing] the
students' knowledge and appreciation of the role that our re-
ligious heritage has played in the social, cultural and histori-
cal developments of civilization.' "5 In Lynch v. Donnelly,3"
the Court upheld the constitutionality of including a nativity
scene in a municipality's annual Christmas display on the
grounds that the display "depicts the historical origins of this
traditional [religious] event recognized as a National Holi-
day"'3 7 and therefore had a legitimate secular purpose. In Ed-
32. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104
(1981).
33. Id. at 42.
34. 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980).
35. Id. at 1314.
36. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
37. Id. at 680 (citations omitted).
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wards v. Aguillard,'8 the Court struck down a Louisiana act
that dealt with the teaching of creationism because it found
the primary purpose of that act was to endorse a particular
religious doctrine and thus ran afoul of the three-prong test
established in the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman. 9 This was so
even though the legislature articulated the "secular purpose"
it had in mind in passing the act.
In an effort to find some order out of the chaotic situa-
tion resulting from its involvement in this quagmire, the Su-
preme Court did set forth the Lemon test which it said should
be applied in determining whether the first amendment had
been fouled. The application of this test has not provided the
solution or guidance that its adopters had hoped that it
would. As Justice Rehnquist commented in his dissent in Wal-
lace v. Jaffree,'40 the so-called purpose prong of the test has
proven mercurial in application because it has never been
fully defined, and the Court has never fully stated how the
test is to operate. As he noted, "If the purpose prong is in-
tended to void those aids to sectarian institutions accompa-
nied by a stated legislative purpose to aid religion, the prong
will condemn nothing so long as the legislature utters a secu-
lar purpose and says nothing about aiding religion."' "4 He
concludes that what the legislators put into their legislative
history and, more importantly, what they leave out, may de-
termine the outcome of the piece of legislation under the
test. He also noted that if this purpose prong is aimed to void
all statutes enacted with the intent to aid sectarian institu-
tions, whether stated in the legislative history or not, then
most statutes providing any aid, such as textbooks or bus
rides for sectarian school children, will fail, and this would be
an anomaly because the Court has already afforded relief in
certain of these type cases.
Justice Brennan promptly noted in the Aguillard case
that the primary purpose of the act in question in that case
violated the establishment clause because it was obvious that
it was the intent of the legislature in adopting the statute to
advance a religious cause, notwithstanding the fact as noted
by Justice Scalia, that the legislature stated otherwise. Justice
Scalia observed:
Although the record contains abundant evidence of sincer-
ity of that purpose, (the only issue pertinent to the case), the
38. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
39. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
40. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
41. Id. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Court today holds, essentially on the basis of its "visceral
knowledge regarding what must have motivated the legisla-
tors," . . . that members of the Louisiana Legislature
knowingly violated their oaths and then lied about it."2
Justice Scalia noted further some of the confusion that
has arisen as a result of prior rulings of the Supreme Court in
this vein. In his dissent, he makes this comment:
We have said essentially the following: government may not
act with the purpose of advancing religion, except when
forced to do so by the free exercise clause (which is now
and then); or when eliminating existing governmental hos-
tility to religion (which exists sometimes); or even when
merely accommodating governmentally uninhibited reli-
gious practices, except that at some point (it is unclear
where) intentional accommodation results in the fostering
of religion, which of course is unconstitutional."'
III. THE EFFECT OF THE NONINTERPRETISTS VIEWPOINT ON
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION: SEGREGATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE
Before examining the impact of Supreme Court deci-
sions on public education, I should comment on the framers'
views with respect to the relationship that would exist be-
tween the national government and religion. James Madison
rose and reminded the House that the time which had been
promised for consideration of the religion clauses had
come."' In regard to these clauses, several proposals were
made and reported in the Annals of Congress. For instance,
Peter Sylvester of New York disliked a particular revision be-
cause he felt it had "a tendency to abolish religion alto-
gether."" Roger Sherman of Connecticut did not feel that
such a clause ought to be included because, under the ex-
isting Constitution, Congress had no delegated authority to
make any decisions relative to religion in any event. Benja-
min Huntington felt that the language being advanced might
be taken in such latitude as to be extremely hurting to the
42. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. at 2591 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(first emphasis added; second emphasis added by Court) (citation omitted).
43. Id. at 2591-92.
44. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 424 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
45. Id. at 729.
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cause of religion and was afraid that others might put an-
other construction to it that would be harmful. Huntington,
too, was from Connecticut and was concerned that the New
England states, which had established religions, might find
themselves in the federal courts entertaining claims based
upon an obligation in regard to religious organizations where
they had no right to be.
In his dissent in Jafree, Justice Rehnquist noted, among
other things, that where it was true that Madison participated
with Jefferson in adopting the Virginia Statute of Religious
Liberty, nowhere does it appear that he, speaking as an advo-
cate of sensible legislative compromise, intended to incorpo-
rate the Virginia statute into the Constitution. He noted it is
more clear that it was Madison's intention to work a compro-
mise that would insure to the people those things that they
desired in regard to religious liberty. The original language
he suggested was as follows: " 'Nor shall any national religion
be established.' "46 This does not conform to any wall of sep-
aration between church and state, an idea which latter-day
commentators have ascribed to him. Indeed, as the Justice
stated, had this been Madison's desire, the Northwest Ordi-
nance, in its existing language, would not have been adopted,
nor would we have Thanksgiving Day proclamations, chap-
lains, or other expressions of gratitude to the Almighty.
This wall of separation was not contemplated by, nor did
it become a part of the history of, that amendment, nor did
Thomas Jefferson ever so consider it. The rubric arose out of
the Reynolds 1 and Everson"' decisions, cases involving the free
exercise clause issue. As the now Chief Justice stated, "It is
impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mis-
taken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortu-
nately the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted
with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years."' 9
He goes on to say that neither does the repetition of this er-
ror by the court make it any sounder historically, and where
"stare decisis may bind courts to matters of law, . . . it cannot
bind them as to matters of history." 50 He further observed
that the greatest injury of this wall notion was its mischievous
46. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 94 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (citation omitted).
47. 98 U.S. 145 at 164 (1879).
48. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
49. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
50. Id. at 99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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diversion of judges from the actual intentions of the drafters
of the Bill of Rights. At this point I must question the ca-
dence being set by the drummer, for the government seems
to have overstepped its boundaries of authority; even though
the so-called "wall of separation" has grown to the
equivalency of the great wall of China, it is engrafted on our
Constitution, if at all, by judicial fiat, and not as the result of
any amendment by "We, the People."
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE NONINTERPRETIST THEORY ON
PUBLIC EDUCATION
Another area where it is evident that the Court is bog-
ging down in the quagmire associated with the doctrine of
incorporation is in connection with its determinations of what
can and cannot be taught in the public schools where religion
is implicated. Justice Brennan stated in his opinion in the
Aguillard case, " '[T]he public school is at once the symbol of
our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting
our common destiny. In no activity of the State is it more
vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools. , ",'
However, as Justice Powell noted:
As a matter of history, school children can and should
properly be informed of all aspects of this Nation's religious
heritage. I would see no constitutional problem if school
children were taught the nature of the Founding Fathers'
religious beliefs and how these beliefs affected the attitudes
of the times and the structure of our government. Courses
in comparative religion of course are customary and consti-
tutionally appropriate. In fact, since religion permeates our
history, a familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is
necessary to understand many historical as well as contem-
porary events. In addition, it is worth noting that the Estab-
lishment Clause does not prohibit per se the educational use
of religious documents in public school education. Al-
though this Court recognized that the Bible is "an instru-
ment of religion," . . . it also has made clear that the Bible
"may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of
history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the
like." . . .The book is, in fact, "the world's all-time best
seller" with undoubted literary and historic value apart
from its religious content. The Establishment Clause is
51. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2577-78 (1987) (citation
omitted).
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properly understood to prohibit the use of the Bible and
other religious documents in public school education only
when the purpose of the use is to advance a particular reli-
gious belief.52
It is obvious that theistic religions have come to be de-
fined as such divisive force to which Justice Brennan alludes.
If you think not, search the annals of the case law and count
the number of cases that you find where this is not so.
Frederick Edwords, Executive Director of the Humanist
Association, observed that "[t]he courts in Arkansas have
ruled that the state . . . must pay nearly $400,000 to the
ACLU for . . . court costs in fighting the creationism law
there. This heavy bill will serve as a deterrent to states
tempted to pass future . . . legislation . . . . " of a similar
vein. As long as the courts remain involved in the issue, what
Justice Powell observed as permissible simply will not occur as
a result of sheer economics.
As testified to in Smith," the problem is further com-
pounded by the fact that secularism, humanism, atheism, ag-
nosticism, and a whole host of other belief systems are ad-
vanced by and in the public education effort today because
they fall within the rubric of secular endeavor. This is so
even though the humanists openly advocate, in a militant
way, that the public schools must be converted into the new
church for the advancement of secular humanism. I quote
from an article that appeared in a 1983 issue of The Humanist
magazine:
I am convinced that the battle for humankind's future must
be waged and won in the public school classroom by teach-
ers who correctly perceive their role as the proselytizers of
a new faith: a religion of humanity . . . .These teachers
must .. .be ministers of another sort, utilizing a classroom
instead of a pulpit to convey humanist values in whatever
subject they teach, regardless of the educational level
55
52. Id. at 2589-90 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnotes and citations
omitted).
53. Edwords, The Turning Tide, THE HUMANIST, July-Aug. 1984, at
35.
54. Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.
1987).




As found by Judge Danny Boggs of the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Educa-
tion," the state has the right to say to parents of children
who are compelled to attend public schools, "My way or the
highway," 7 when determining what educational information
is to be imparted. School boards can and do, so testified the
Smith experts, advance a religion of humanism with impunity
because they are reluctant to take up the expensive fights
that ensue if there is anything at all related to theistic reli-
gion in the curriculum. So we have as a result manufacturers
or producers of textbooks removing any and all such refer-
ences in order to be able to sell texts to the school systems.
Such gutting of moral base for learning results in state-
programmed souls that march to a beat unknown to the
Founders of our freedoms.
Justice Brennan said that the amendment process incor-
porated in the Constitution requires an immense effort by the
people as a whole and need not be strictly adhered to if the
overarching theory of the worth and dignity of the human is
kept in view. Thus, he concludes, the Constitution may be
expanded to fit the needs of the times by considering the
principle that it is the foremost duty of the Court to do this
in preservation of individual rights. Has the amendment by
the Supreme Court incorporating the first amendment to the
states accomplished this goal articulated by Justice Brennan?
V. THE DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION: PUBLIC EDUCATION
AND THE DECLINE OF FEDERALISM
As Russell Kirk notes:
From history, as from humane letters, every generation ac-
quires its sense of the human condition; its acquaintance
with the possibilities and the limitations of human action; its
awareness that we, the living, are involved in what Bert
called 'the contract of eternal society,' which joins us with
those who have preceded us in time, and with those who
will follow us in time. The historical consciousness shows
men and women that they are part of the great continuity
and essence, possessed of duties and rights - something
better than naked apes, something higher than the beasts
that perish . . . .The eagerness for true learning seems to
be much diminished in our age, in that intellectual and
56. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
57. Id. at 1074 (Boggs, J., concurring).
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moral results of schooling seem inferior, at every level of
society. . . . Perhaps because, as Manning wrote, all differ-
ences of opinion are theological at bottom. The Americans
of two centuries ago shared, nearly all of them, certain as-
sumptions about human nature; and those assumptions
were founded upon religious doctrines . . . . It may be said
of the Americans of 1786 that in general they believed in
the existence of a transcendent order governing the uni-
verse; in the teaching that man is made for eternity, in the
dogma that human beings have a proclivity toward the sin-
ful, in the concept of the community of souls and the com-
munity of this earth, with the duties that communities re-
quire . . . . When . . . those fundamental beliefs are
denied or gradually atrophy, the traditions that have lent
generations to generation begin to wither. Outward forms
may remain, but they are sapless."
By virtue of our courts' incorporating the first amend-
ment to the states, our schools no longer feel free to permit
the discussion of ultimate questions and they become dull
forms for tribal disputes. As C.S. Lewis put it:
We continue to clamor for those very qualities we are ren-
dering impossible . . . in a sort of ghastly simplicity we re-
move the organ and demand the function. We make men
without chests and expect virtue and enterprise. We laugh
at honor and are shocked to find traitors in our midst. We
castrate and bid the gelding to be fruitful."
Thomas Flemming wrote in Tyranny and a Good Cause:
Ours was once a limited government with a delicate system
of checks and balances. More than the balance of powers
between the three branches of the central government, the
federalists' distribution among the various levels of govern-
ment was an insurance against tyranny. For some time now
we have elevated a number of principles above the federal
arrangement: social and economic justice, equality, individ-
ual liberty-in a word democracy. The result has been tyr-
anny in a good cause, but tyranny nonetheless. As Ameri-
cans contemplate their Constitution and its legacy, they
58. R. Kirk, Speech entitled "Content, Character and Choice in
Schooling: Public Policy and Research Implications" (April 24, 1986)(available at the National Council on Educational Research in Washington,
D.C.).
59. C.S. LEwIs, ABOLITION OF MAN 16 (1947).
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would do well to remember that it was federalism-not de-
mocracy-that guaranteed their liberties and that it is fed-
eralism that needs to be restored."'
As part of this federalism, John Witherspoon, an influential
mentor of many of the nation's Founders, said: "[T]he right
of a person to judge for himself or herself 'in all matters of
religion' [is] an 'unalienable right.' God-given, this right
could not be given or taken away by any ecclesiastical or civil
power." 1
By incorporation, thus depriving the peoples of the de-
termination of how they will perform and provide moral edu-
cation, the federal courts are now the only ones who may
probe intentions, be they pre-enactment legislative intentions
or others, whenever a communities' moral requirements are
debated. This impinges upon inalienable rights and is an area
that is insoluble even if undertaken. No court would ever be
in a position to conclusively determine just what motivated
the final passage by a legislature of any piece of legislation.
So why, in the name of preserving individual rights, do we
deny the wisdom of abstaining decreed by our Founders?
The beat that I hear from my drummer is one that Rich-
ard John Neuhaus must likewise hear for he states: "The ex-
clusion of religiously-based judgment from [public] debate
. . . must now be seen as an unnatural and failed experiment
in our public life. In law, in political theory, in education, and
in the sciences it is increasingly recognized that few judg-
ments of consequence are value neutral."6 2 For the courts to
try or continue to try to legally legislate in this area is a failed
undertaking and will ever continue thus.
Gary Leedes observed: "The First Amendment is given a
perverse spin when the United States Supreme Court inhibits
religious freedom by excluding bible-based moral judgments
from the sphere of legitimate legislative activity."6 " He
strongly admonishes that it is unrealistic and objectionable to
expect people to distinguish between their interwoven reli-
gious and secular beliefs when they are psychologically una-
60. Flemming, Tyranny in a Good Cause, CHRONICLES MAG. AM. CUL-
TURE, Dec. 1987, at 10.
61. J. SMYLIE, JAMES MADISON, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 9
(1986).
62. R. J. Neuhaus, Speech delivered to the American Jewish Commit-
tee's National Convention, Washington, D.C., May 16, 1986.
63. Leedes, Taking the Bible Seriously, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 311, 313
(1987).
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ble to isolate isomorphic statements fused in their mentality.
He says the Supreme Court should eschew any role that re-
quires judges to uncover the real foundations of legislative
action in order to accomplish a social transformation, for he
concludes that this is exactly what the Supreme Court was
doing in Everson v. Board of Education" and in Stone v. Gra-
ham.6 What finally prompts a legislator to vote for a bill can
be quite different from the question of whether there are
good reasons that connect that vote with traditional views of
morality. So, when you pursue this to its logical conclusion,
you not only engage in trying to devise a strict separation be-
tween church and state, but you actually engage in separating
reality and the law. Leedes went on to comment that Thomas
Jefferson recognized that the foundation of morals lies in sen-
timent, not in science, and where many scholars today argue
that because of our pluralistic assumptions of a democratic
republic this automatically disqualifies the Bible as a source of
sentiment and valid law. The irony is-that these assumptions
discriminate invidiously against a set of time-tested ideas that
have universal appeal to devout Jews, Christians, and many
nonbelievers. Genuine pluralism, Leedes notes, invokes com-
petition in ideas held by different groups of people, and au-
thentic nondiscriminatory pluralism is broad enough to sup-
port laws inspired by communal values with a biblical
pedigree. In this he supports Chief Justice Rehnquist in his
statement: " 'The Establishment Clause does not require that
the public sector be insulated from all things which may have
a religious significance or origin.'" 66
CONCLUSION
Whether it is proper in our schools to teach the morality
of the Judeo-Christian faith, or any other, to me is a decision
to be made by the people and their legislators as contem-
plated by the Constitution. It is not one for the courts so long
as the federal government makes no law concerning the es-
tablishment of a religion. There is no evidence that judges
are better equipped to define what is best in this undertaking
than are the peoples themselves. If, as stated by the Sixth
64. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
65. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104
(1981).




Circuit, the state can say, "My way or the highway,""7 and if,
as stated by the Supreme Court, "The public school is at
once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive
means for promoting our common destiny," 8 then why is it
that the federal courts have determined that only they can
lay out the course of instruction in this sensitive field of reli-
gion and morality?
Our real freedom rings only in the tones of the bell as it
is cast. It is a fragile thing, and our right to possess or exer-
cise it depends in large measure on our conceptions of what it
should be. But regardless of how you cast it, freedom and
liberty are emotions that presuppose the existence of and re-
side within the soul of man. To this end, Judge Learned
Hand once said:
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies
there, no Constitution, no law, no court can save it; no Con-
stitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it.
While it lies there it needs no Constitution, no law, no court
to save it. And what is this liberty which must lie in the
hearts of men and women? It is not the ruthless, the unbri-
dled will; it is not freedom to do as one likes. That is the
denial of liberty, and leads straight to its overthrow. A soci-
ety in which men recognize no check upon their freedom
soon becomes a society where freedom is the possession of
only a savage few; as we have learned to our sorrow.
What then is the spirit of liberty? I cannot define it; I
can only tell you my own faith. The spirit of liberty is the
spirit which it not too sure that it is right; the spirit of lib-
erty is the spirit which seeks to understand the minds of
other men and women; the spirit of liberty is the spirit
which weighs their interest alongside its own without bias;
the spirit of liberty remembers that even a sparrow falls to
earth unheeded; the spirit of liberty is the spirit of Him
who, nearly 2,000 years ago, taught mankind that lesson it
has never learned, but has never quite forgotten; that there
may be a kingdom where the least shall be heard and con-
sidered side by side with the greatest.69
67. Mozert v. Hawkins, 827 F.2d 1058, 1074 (6th Cir. 1987) (Boggs,
J., concurring).
68. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231
(1948).
69. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 190 (1960).
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Control of access to ideas and teachings from which
value judgments are drawn and truths secured does not sus-
tain the rights of the citizen and protect him from an over-
bearing government, but, on the contrary, effectively creates
a state mind and a programmed soul without his actually real-
izing it. The deafening beat of the drummer that I hear
pounds out a tune that sings that it will do no violence to the
rule of law to look backward to the wisdom of other times to
discover the propriety of insulating the people in the exercise
of their first amendment rights from the restrictions that
have been imposed upon them by virtue of the incorporation
principle, a condition as to which they have had no say. The
people today can preserve these rights for themselves given
that chance, and I am eternally grateful that our forefathers
agreed.
